Musings on Law and Intelligence (Artificial and Natural)
"The future is already here - it's just not very evenly distributed." William Gibson
"Wisdom is the abstract of the past, but beauty is the promise of the future." Oliver Wendell Holmes
Monday, 19 March 2012
LL.M. Studies in the United States - Do We Have Something to Learn?
Saturday, 17 March 2012
Games computers play, part n
Von IBM lernen heißt siegen lernen
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| (Paul Rand 1981) |
Another IBM Research landmark took place last year, when Watson, an AI program built to excel in Jeopardy!, beat two all-time champions in a specially televised tournament. Allegedly you can find the actual shows on Youtube (but of course I can't link to them because I'm a too much of a copyright prude). And of course there are bound to be more such landmark achievements to come. One of those could be delivered by the Blue Brain project, which is an attempt to build a molecular-level computer simulation of an entire human brain.
The game show Jeopardy! itself is perhaps not that well known in Finland. As far as I can remember, a local version of it ran on one of the channels I never watch for a season or two after which it was probably cancelled. It is a quiz format with 2 sets of 6 categories of questions with 5 questions each worth a different amount of money plus various added features. The questions or clues rely heavily on wordplay and all kinds of creative elements so it is definitely not just a matter of parsing the clue and looking up the answer, as the variability in the clues makes them impossible to interpret them correctly just by parsing. The most easily distinguishing characteristic of the game is that answers (at least pragmatically speaking) in turn have to be phrased syntactically in the form of a question. For a novice competitor of the human persuasion this of course adds to the cognitive load and occasionally makes them forget this, thus making even a factually correct answer technically incorrect. For a computer program equipped with a good lexical database, on the other hand, complying with this rule is fairly trivial: just check whether the answer is a person or not and whether it is singular or plural and prefix who/what and is/are accordingly. If you want to get really fancy, also see whether you should prefix the answer with an article (definite or indefinite).
Chess as a game is computationally closed. The numbers of pieces, their positions and possible moves and complete games are all finite. The number of possible games is enormous, and except for the very end of the game, it is quite simply impossible to even list all of them, never mind also evaluating all of them to see which move is the best one to take next. So while simpler games such as tic-tac-toe can be solved by simple brute force in an instant (see xkcd), Deep Blue had to rely heavily on heuristics and libraries of sequences of moves to accomplish its task. (By the way, Deep Blue used a great deal of dedicated custom hardware to do this, while Watson ran just on general-purpose computers.) Jeopardy!, on the other hand, is not computationally closed. The list of potential topics for the categories is unbounded, and typically a category combines at least two of them, described initially only through a clever and opaque title for the category.
As an occasional legal theorist and thus someone who is also interested in rules just for their own sake, at least for me it is interesting to note that for chess, the rules of the game itself are only about ten pages long. What is even more relevant is that Deep Blue does not even implement all of them properly. For example, the program was not able to recognize a tie, but rather relied on people to recognize such events. I have not been able to find a mention about what the program would have done in the event of an invalid move by its opponent that goes unnoticed by the judge, either. (Not that that is likely to be a real issue at that level.) And of course a computer is completely unaffected by such possible rule violations as Tal's devious and distracting smile, which was also used as an example by Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously p. 102). Chess and in particular Chess AI is therefore not a very good model for the legal field. As an application, it is not easily generalizable, and the market for chess processors must be quite limited.
Watson, on the other hand, was not built just to kick some human butt in Jeopardy! and to get a ton of publicity while doing it. IBM have announced plans to develop the underlying DeepQA technology further for deployment in a variety of fields of expertise, including law. For the time being it seems to me that they are strongly concentrating on the medical and financial sectors. (It certainly wouldn't surprise me if their market research had shown that lawyers are too conservative and not tech-savvy enough for it to be a potential commercial success, at least for now.) But there is still a live connection, as CMU, the academic home of both Deep Blue and Watson, is just down the street from Pitt Law School, one of the centres of AI & law research in the US. Watson principal investigator Dr. David Ferrucci also gave a keynote address at ICAIL last June in Pittsburgh. We'll have to wait and see.
The idea of Watson, J., has even reached the top of the legal establishment at our poor frontiers (or whatever 'raukoilla rajoilla' is in English). At the Finnish Bar Association's annual conference this January, the Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland, Petri Jääskeläinen, LL.D., opened his address (only in Finnish, sorry) with Watson (and Chicken Run, nice touch there) and the horror scenario of computers deciding cases of law. My own position on the issue is of course already on the record: I'm afraid neither my rank nor my GI tract are strong enough for me to trust my gut instincts enough to even consider the question whether without having at least some clues about the how, where and why as well. And right now we're really only getting to the point where we are shaping the right questions while at the same time trying to figure out at least tentative answers to them to see whether indeed even the questions make sense. It is not like decision-support systems or the evil robot judges will just appear out of nowhere (and for the time being the utter bogosity of public sector software procurement procedures is certainly the first and the best line of defence against them...), but rather they should preferably appear in contexts where they actually make all kinds of sense. Meanwhile, there are plenty of much less scary types of intelligent software technologies not used enough in the legal (especially information retrieval) field to get things started, but more about them later on.
More on Deep Blue and chess:
Feng-Hsiung Hsu: Behind Deep Blue: Building the Computer that Defeated the World Chess Champion (Princeton UP 2002)
Diego Rasskin-Gutman: Chess Metaphors: Artificial Intelligence and the Human Mind (MIT Press 2009)
Pertti Saariluoma: Chess Players' Thinking: A Cognitive Psychological Approach (Routledge 1995)
More on Watson: IBM Research (lots of videos as well)
Are you interested in articles on file sharing?
Thursday, 15 March 2012
Turing Award to Judea Pearl
I have (and have read) Pearl's two major works, Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems: Networks of Plausible Inference (Morgan Kaufmann 1988) and Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (Cambridge UP 2000) and cannot praise them highly enough. Especially the first one has had an enormous impact on AI (though not so much AI & law), these days the Bayesian methods presented in it are quite simply ubiquitous and indispensable. I do have my reservations about their applicability to representing uncertainty in law, but more about that at some other time. (I have read Pearl's 1988 UCLA technical report on Non-Bayesian Formalisms for Managing Uncertainty as well, after all.) For a more sympathetic take on Bayesianism in law, see eg. Law and Truth: A Theory of Evidence by Hannu Tapani Klami, Minna Gräns, and Johanna Sorvettula (The Finnish Society of Sciences and Letters 2000).
(via NYT Bits)
Technological Rationality: the Logos of Slavery or the Enabler of Human(e) Progress?
Technological development has faced criticism. The efficiency brought by industrialization and computer technology is expected to eventually lead to unpleasant outcome. The critics have developed by means of science-fiction stories about a future filled with technology. It is assumed that people stagnate and indulge only their animal desires. In the second scenario, the people become insensitive robots relying only on pure reason.
Herbert Marcuse was of the opinion that the logos of technology equals to the logos of slavery. People have become tools, even if it was thought that the technology releases persons. In his book One-dimensional Man published in 1964, Marcuse says that in the historical continuum man has been and will be the master of the other man. This is a social reality which societal changes do not affect. The basis for domination, however, has changed over the ages. Personal dependence has been replaced by an objective order of dependency, such as the dependency of a slave to the master has changed to the dependence of the economic laws and of the market. In accordance with Marcuse this higher form of rationality deprives natural and spiritual resources more efficiently and shares profits in a new way. A man can be seen as a slave in the production machinery and there is a battle of the existence in the production machinery. The battle affects with the destructive power the production machinery and its parts, such as builders and users.
Marcuse’s ideas certainly give some food for thought. And while I don’t completely agree with them. The development and use of intelligent machines face tremendous challenges in current legal systems. Technological development is stifled by liability risks. Due to both the technological limitations for perfectly functioning machines and the unpredictable cognitive element, intelligent machines are not perfect and it is almost guaranteed that there will be failures causing harm. However, this is not an excuse not to aim for failure-free operation. Instead, the inevitable failures should be managed so that present economical or legal issues do not hinder the potential human development and prosperity enabled through the adoption of new technologies. To read more about my and my co-author’s thoughts on this: http://www.njcl.utu.fi/2_2010/huttunen_anniina.pdf
Steve Fuller, New frontiers in science and technology (Polity, Cambridge 2007) 232 p
Herbert Marcuse, Yksiulotteinen ihminen: teollisen yhteiskunnan tarkastelua (W+G, Helsinki 1969) 262 p
What's this?
The title of this blog, Legal Futurology, contains a certain degree of deliberate ambiguity. You, Dear Reader, may wonder, what kind of a future we are talking about and what the law has to do it. At this point we don't expect we will be writing about futures (the financial instruments) or about future developments in the law in general, say, regarding the resolution of the financial crisis or the next EU treaty or planned directive this or statute that or what the court will (or should) decide in Rubber v. Glue or whatever. While we cannot promise to avoid such topics altogether (classic evasive move there), what we have in mind are some very specific aspects of the future and the law.
The future we are referring to is that of the William Gibson quotation 'The future is already here — it's just not very evenly distributed.' It is also that of Richard Susskind's book Future of Law*. And since at least one of us is a board-certified Legal Realist, there might be the odd dash of future in the sense of Prediction Theory thrown in as well.
More concretely, we both are researchers at the University of Helsinki working at the intersection of law and artificial intelligence. Our perspectives are quite different, as one of us (Anniina) studies AI as the object of legal regulation, whereas the other (Anna) studies AI as a tool to facilitate legal information retrieval or even do legal reasoning by itself. These complementary perspectives should open up for a broader range of topics than either one of us could do by herself. We are also planning to take advantage of this in more traditional fora through co-authored publications (stay tuned!).
Speaking of publications, we also see this blog as an opportunity to develop our research ideas in a manner better suited for a field in which the pace of technical development is so overwhelming that traditional publication-based academic discussion just doesn't cut it, especially if the ideas are slated for publication in a monograph x years from now rather than as a standalone article. We will of course also be writing about our own articles as well as interesting stuff we have read elsewhere. The style of the posts would probably not get past peer review (and anyway one can't just print out all one's blog posts and call it a dissertation, right?) but some of texts published here are bound to end up in our more serious publications more or less verbatim. To steal terminology from the software industry, we see this blog as a platform for rapid prototyping or Agile Development of our research ideas, which of course is very much in vogue these days. If you agree with what we write, we don't mind if you show it, and if you vehemently disagree with us, we would appreciate your (civil) comments even more.
Or, as put by the Agile Development guru Benjamin Cardozo:
'I sometimes think that we worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of our errors. They may work a little confusion for a time. In the end, they will be modified or corrected or their teachings ignored. The future takes care of such things. In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine.'#
Share and enjoy,
Anna & Anniina
* OUP 1996. You should really read his The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (OUP 2008) instead, but we couldn't possibly reuse that as a title for the blog, now could we?
# The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press 1921), p. 179
